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Hyperinstrumentalism and Cultural Policy: Means to an End or an End to Meaning? 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the implications for cultural policy of the logic of the instrumental view 
of culture being taken to its conclusion. Policy developments that establish sets of justifications 
and rationales that have nothing to do with the cultural content of the policy concerned, but 
which arise from a deliberate realignment of policy frameworks, establish a form of 
hyperinstrumentalism. With hyperinstrumentalism the focus on outcomes and the ends of 
policy means that cultural policy is only as important as the ends to which it is directed. As 
such, hyperinstrumentalisation demonstrates the consequences for the sector of conditions 
where claims about the value of culture are irrelevant to political actors. The paper questions 
whether this shift can be made sense of as a coherent and strategic political choice rather than 
as a simple assault on culture. The case of Northern Ireland’s Department of Culture, Arts and 
Leisure is used to explain this policy shift. The authors question whether hyperinstrumentalism 
undermines the justification for an autonomous domain of cultural policy. 
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Introduction 
The developing debate about the instrumentalisation of cultural policy (Vestheim, 1994; Gray, 
2007; Gibson, 2008; Belfiore, 2012) has seen a shift from investigations of the underlying 
causes of the phenomenon to the specific policy implications of instrumentalisation in terms of 
policy formation, implementation and evaluation. Part of this change in focus has been the 
consequence of a desire to move beyond what has become an increasingly sterile debate 
concerning the perceived clash between the ‘instrumental’ and ‘intrinsic’ dimensions of 
cultural policy (Holden, 2004) to develop more productive understandings of the roles that 
cultural policy plays within societies (O’Brien, 2013). This does not mean that the concepts of 
cultural policy instrumentalism and instrumentalisation have become redundant, only that they 
require elaboration if they are to contribute anything meaningful to the analysis of cultural 
policy itself. Recent discussions of the uses of policy instrumentalisation in cultural policy have 
stressed the ways in which cultural policy-makers have shifted from being people to whom 
instrumentalism happens to being active agents who manage instrumentalisation for their own 
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ends (McCall, 2009; Nisbett, 2013; Gray, 2014), with this often taking place through processes 
of ‘defensive instrumentalism’ (Belfiore, 2012) or ‘policy attachment’ (Gray, 2002).This shift 
in focus has made it clear that in many, if not all, cases instrumentalisation is a contested 
process and that cultural policy actors are not as helpless in the face of exogenous policy 
demands as some of the original literature implied, and as most of the instrumental/intrinsic 
binary continues to assume. 
 
However it was always the case that crude instrumentalisation (in the sense of a simple 
imposition of the concerns of other policy sectors onto those of cultural policy) depended for 
its effect on the willingness of exogenous policy actors, such as national governments, to 
enforce their preferences on cultural policy actors, particularly at the regional and local levels 
where central power holds less sway. As such, the greater the pressure to prioritise central 
policy expectations and requirements that were or are concerned with non-cultural sets of 
policy priorities, the more difficult it would be for outright resistance or more subtle forms of 
policy management to have effect. In this respect the internal management of external policy 
demands takes place within limits, and these limits are not determined by actors in the cultural 
policy sector at all. The consequence of this is that cultural policy, in practice, is in a relatively 
weak position in comparison with other policy sectors which have greater access to claims of 
policy necessity, centrality, legitimacy or priority than does the cultural sector itself (Gray and 
Wingfield, 2010). In these circumstances it is not surprising that the cultural policy sector tends 
to be seen as an embattled arena of political action whose claims of policy centrality and 
importance are simply not accepted as being relevant in their own right but only in so far as 
they actively contribute to the other policy ambitions that governments have. Given the 
political weaknesses that the cultural policy sector has as a consequence of its status as a matter 
of ‘low politics’ (Bulpitt, 1983, p.3) it could even be argued that an active management of 
instrumentalising pressures, as part of a politics of policy survival that depends upon how the 
cultural sector actively contributes to non-cultural policy ambitions, could actually turn in to a 
politics of policy extinction if ‘culture’ becomes simply a means to a non-cultural policy end. 
Indeed Belfiore (2002, p.104) argued that “if the logic of the instrumental view of culture … 
is taken to its extreme (but intrinsically consequential) conclusions, there would be no point in 




This paper is concerned with investigating the extent to which this fear for cultural policy has 
the potential to become a policy reality. Does an increasing emphasis on non-cultural policy 
intentions lead to a loss of meaning for cultural policy in its own terms and, if so, what are the 
implications for the policy sector as a whole? The question of whether the combined emphasis 
on the instrumental efficacy of cultural policy (from both cultural policy and non-cultural 
policy actors) has contributed to policy developments that establish sets of policy justifications 
and rationales that have nothing to do with the cultural content of the policy concerned but 
which arise, instead, from a deliberate realignment of policy frameworks becomes central to 
this argument. This re-structuring of public policy, it will be argued, has the effect of 
establishing a form of hyperinstrumentalisation for cultural policy where outcomes replace 
inputs, outputs and intentions as the basis upon which policy rests. In this view 
instrumentalisation sees cultural policy as a means to a non-cultural end but it is still the case 
that it is the cultural content of the policy that provides it with meaning: 
hyperinstrumentalisation, on the other hand, is only concerned with ends and the meaning of 
cultural policy lies solely in those ends. As such, within hyperinstrumentalism considerations 
of cultural value are effectively irrelevant. To demonstrate this argument the recent case 
contained in the history of the Northern Irish Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL) 
from 1999-2016 is used to explain how the shift from instrumentalism to hyperinstrumentalism 
has taken place. 
 
The Logic of Instrumental Cultural Policy 
All policy is instrumental in so far as it is concerned with using certain mechanisms to achieve 
certain ends. In the case of cultural policy it has become something of a common complaint 
that the ends to which policy is being increasingly applied are not only non-cultural at best 
(Hesmondalgh et al, 2015), but positively anti-cultural at worst (Holden, 2004, 2006; Selwood, 
2002). Whilst this is posited on the basis of the assumed intrinsic values of culture – and largely 
without explaining what these values might be – the core problem for cultural policy is not the 
loss of cultural value so much as the loss of financial subsidy that it may give rise to. If 
instrumental outputs are the basis upon which public funds are allocated to culture, and if it 
cannot be convincingly demonstrated that culture contributes to these outputs, then why 
continue to fund it? The fact that governments have used instrumental arguments to justify 
financial support for culture for many years (Gibson, 2008) does not mean that they necessarily 
have to continue to do so. The weaknesses of the evidence base for the positive contribution 
that culture may have for a variety of instrumental purposes has been long recognised (Shaw, 
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1999), and the problems in demonstrating unambiguous causal and attributional effects from 
cultural activities are endemic within the sector (Gray, 2009). In the case of Northern Ireland, 
for example, there is little ‘hard’ evidence of a direct link between cultural engagement and 
improved social inclusion in areas of high deprivation (Hull, 2013). In circumstances such as 
these, the concern is that funding may be removed from ‘culture’ and assigned to areas 
demonstrating much more evident success in meeting the non-cultural policy requirements that 
governments have. 
 
This fear for the future of cultural funding, as a result of the problems of actually demonstrating 
the non-cultural instrumental benefits arising from state-funded cultural activity, can be seen 
to be a direct consequence of the weakening of the long-established Keynesian argument that 
cultural funding should be based on cultural concerns, rather than those that are connected to 
any other policy interests that governments may have. The Keynesian notion that public 
expenditure can be used as a tool for the management of the economy as a whole concerned 
the use-value that could be derived from the provision of public goods and services, with these 
uses being directly related to their content (Gray, 2000). A shift in emphasis from direct use-
value to more instrumentalised versions of policy worth coincided with changes in the language 
describing cultural expenditure and the increasing use of economic terminologies of ‘subsidy’ 
(Belfiore, 2002) and ‘investment’ (Hewison, 1995; Garnham, 2005). This linguistic shift then 
reinforced the perception that the point of active cultural policies rested on their investment 
return rather than the specifically cultural content of their outputs, with this return being 
appraised in terms of non-cultural outcomes. The extent to which this has occurred may be 
debatable but the increasing expectation that cultural investment will contribute to, for 
example, the production of creative cities (Florida, 2004) and urban regeneration (Grodach & 
Silver, 2013) has certainly become a global phenomenon, while the calls for cultural 
organisations to demonstrate their social impact through their contributions to health and social 
inclusion have also become increasingly common. The extent to which these demands have led 
to actual shifts in funding patterns or to changes in working practices within cultural 
organisations is, however, much less clear (Bunting, 2010; Gray, 2016) suggesting that the 
argument has become a matter of policy rhetoric rather than developing into one concerning 
policy practice (Belfiore, 2009). 
 
The manner in which this rhetorical exercise takes place is based on the underlying 
philosophical position of epiphenomenalism: in this case the claim that instrumental outcomes 
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are a purely secondary effect arising from the intrinsic value of cultural outputs. While the 
intrinsic/instrumental dichotomy has many weaknesses in terms of effective meaning it does 
provide a powerful rhetorical device that continues to play a key role in the defensive 
arguments that are often associated with, for example, arts and ‘cultural’ advocacy (as in 
Jowell, 2004). Indeed, instrumental agendas frequently encourage a feeling of empowerment 
through enhanced political visibility for the sector (Wilson, 2015). The value of these 
arguments rests on the proposition that the relationship at stake is one where cultural value is 
prior to instrumental value, with this being rarely questioned and being taken largely as an 
article of faith by proponents (as in Ellis, 2004; Lowry, 2005; Tusa, 2014). By emphasising the 
priority of cultural value over instrumental value the intention is to ensure that the potential for 
a reversal of this position (that is, that instrumental value is given priority over cultural value) 
is at least reduced if not entirely denied (Royseng, 2008). This position is effective in 
maintaining the status of ‘culture’ as something of greater meaning, significance and value than 
other policy sectors but it is not necessarily the case that it will always be treated as such.  
 
The epiphenomenal position that forms the basis for privileging culture over all other concerns 
has been derived from inside the cultural sector, but it is not necessarily the case that actors 
from other policy sectors share it. Even at the level of the analysis of cultural policy it is quite 
clear that the assumptions of cultural priority are not always present in terms of understanding 
how cultural policy functions (Gray, 2010), as can be seen by comparing the conflicting 
economic analyses of art and culture developed by Throsby (2001), working from the 
assumption that cultural value adds something over and above economic value, and Towse 
(2011), who sees the arts as simply another arena for the application of economic analysis that 
has nothing intrinsically special about it in terms of value, even if the specific features of culture 
in terms of how it functions as a production sector may need to be borne in mind when applying 
economics to it (Towse, 2010, p.6). If policy makers do not share the dominant epiphenomenal 
position adopted by the defenders of arts and culture where these take priority of place, then 
what are the policy consequences that arise, and what are the implications for the organisation 
and functioning of the cultural policy sector in these circumstances? It is these consequences 
and implications that provide the context within which the changing status of Northern 
Ireland’s Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL) is examined. 
 
Cultural Policy Change in Northern Ireland 
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The complex, and often bitter, politics of Northern Ireland had already seen the creation (in 
19201) and collapse (in 1972) of devolved government before its resurrection in 1998 with the 
establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Even this development has not been entirely 
smooth with periods of suspension taking place before the current period, since 2007, of 
continuous independent operation. DCAL itself was created in 1999 to assume responsibility 
for a wide range of services, even though these services were many fewer than those which are 
dealt with by the UK Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). Like the DCMS, 
however, DCAL was responsible for funding a wide range of Non-Departmental Public Bodies 
- arm’s-length bodies such as Northern Ireland Screen, the Northern Ireland Museums Council 
and Arts Council of Northern Ireland - as well as acting as co-sponsor of two cross-border 
agencies in conjunction with the government of Ireland. Equally, as with the DCMS, DCAL 
had survived unchanged since its original foundation – proposed reforms of the public sector 
in Northern Ireland left their central government Departments out of the discussion from fears 
for the stability of the overall political system rather than anything else, even though the overall 
system of government had been seen as anachronistic as well as inefficient, cumbersome and 
fragmented (Knox & Carmichael, 2006, p.944-45). 
 
The development of the administrative system in Northern Ireland has been quite clearly 
affected by the ideologies and political choices that have been made by the elected and 
appointed representatives on whom the system relies. Since devolution, the political discourse 
on arts policy has been contingent on local socio-economic factors and party politics (Chaney, 
2015). The difficulty is that since 2007 the framework of government may have delivered 
stability in governmental arrangements but it has not provided ‘effective governance that made 
a positive difference to people’s lives’ (Cochrane, 2013, p.242). The multiple divisions inside 
Northern Ireland have been seen to lead to a willingness to make things function when 
agreements between competing groups could be reached but that these agreements tended to 
be on matters of general policy rather than on specific, detailed and unambiguous policies 
(Cochrane, 2013, p.247-50). While the existence of ambiguous policies is by no means unheard 
of in the field of cultural policy (Gray, 2015) the specific circumstances of Northern Ireland 
have contributed to a position where such vagueness has become entrenched throughout the 
policy framework that DCAL was working within, leading to the replacement of specifically 
‘cultural’ policy goals and intentions by a set of broader aims that pay scant regard to anything 
                                                          
1 Although it started to function in 1921 the Stormont Assembly was created by Act of Parliament in 1920 
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other than their own fulfilment. This, in turn, has been greatly affected by the reluctance of 
both the British government and Northern Irish Executive to introduce many of the reforms 
into the Northern Irish context that had been implanted into the British administrative system 
since the early 1970s (Knox & Carmichael, 2006). This has meant that something as potentially 
politically toxic in a divided society as matters of ‘culture’ was being organised and managed 
within an administrative system that had some real limitations in terms of room for manoeuvre, 
and which had not been subject to real revision and development since the early 1970s.   
 
To investigate the consequences of these political and administrative weaknesses for the overall 
current cultural policy of the Northern Ireland Executive, and the strategy that underpins it, a 
starting-point lies in the Programme for Government 2011-15, which details the Key Priorities 
of the Executive for that period (Northern Ireland Executive, 2011). These priorities were to 
be found in the promotion of equality and the ending of poverty and social exclusion, with 
these functioning as top-level general policy commitments that all five parties in the Northern 
Ireland Executive could agree with. Such broad-brush policy aims, however, require 
considerable translation at the Departmental level before they can actually become specific 
courses of action that are implementable in practice. The way in which DCAL undertook this 
translation process demonstrates the manner in which the previously dominant epiphenomenal 
position adopted by supporters of culture and the arts, where the centrality of these leads to the 
production of other (non-cultural and arts) policy benefits by itself, has been transformed in 
such a way that the potential need for a separate cultural policy, located within a separate 
‘cultural’ Department, has been effectively nullified. 
 
The key document which illustrates this change is the DCAL Business Plan 2013-14 (DCAL, 
2013). In this the reversal of intention from the cultural component of policy towards the 
broader goals and commitments of the Executive is made explicit: 
 
… promoting equality and tackling poverty and social exclusion are now being placed 
first and foremost when framing policy and allocating resources. While it is accepted 
that there are clear benefits from culture, arts and sports in and of themselves, it is 
essential that we ensure that public investment promotes equality and tackles poverty 




By itself this could be seen as a simple switch in the policy outcomes that DCAL is looking to 
produce through the policy choices about the outputs that it will use to attain them. However, 
the Business Plan goes beyond this to argue that instead of the Department producing culture, 
art and leisure policies and then considering how these could be ‘tailored’ to meet non-culture, 
arts and leisure policy objectives, the focus should be more simply on determining “what policy 
needs to be developed and what services need to be delivered to positively promote equality 
and tackle poverty and social exclusion” (DCAL, 2013, p.8). In other words, the policies of the 
Department should become ones where outcomes determine outputs rather than those where 
outputs contribute to outcomes. In this respect the key switch in the focus of policy is away 
from a simple instrumentalisation of culture, arts and leisure towards a re-making of the whole 
point of their existence. The cultural, arts and leisure component of policy outputs becomes 
irrelevant in the face of more central political demands that they should, instead, be understood 
simply as equality, anti-poverty and anti-social exclusion policies in the first place. As was 
noted by a senior civil servant from DCAL (Hansard, 2013, p.2) at the Ministerial briefing for 
the Committee for Culture, Arts and Leisure at which the Business Plan was presented, the 
plan had “shifted the Department’s whole focus”. 
 
Alongside this shift in the focus of policy statements and intentions, various supporting 
mechanisms are intended to be introduced to limit the capability of DCAL to dilute the focus 
on equality and poverty during the process of policy implementation. This is intended to be 
achieved through the introduction of “hard targets demonstrating significant resources are 
being directly and effectively dedicated” to the new policy aims of the Department (DCAL, 
2013, p.13). While ‘targets’ of many different sorts had become an engrained part of the British 
political systems of England, Scotland and Wales from the 1980s onwards – and continue in 
force to the current date, even if under different labels to those that had previously been applied 
- the Northern Irish system had not used them with anything like as much enthusiasm. The 
intention to build them in to the reporting mechanisms to inform policy, therefore, marked a 
new direction for cultural policy and one which had no connection to culture, arts and leisure 
but to other policy intentions altogether. In such circumstances arguing for particular policy 
choices on the grounds that they would produce positive cultural, arts and leisure outcomes 
becomes a policy irrelevancy as these are no longer worth considering given that the relevant 




In this respect more traditional policy options and strategies for policy development and change 
in the field of cultural policy lose their importance. The whole focus of policy shifts away from 
the meaning and point of cultural policy as a specific field of action, with its own specific 
outputs and outcomes, towards it being a component part of a different policy field altogether. 
Thus, the deliberate use of attachment strategies to generate various forms of support for 
cultural policy outputs is predicated on demonstrating how culture can be a contributor towards 
the policy goals and intentions of other policy sectors regardless of whether it actually succeeds 
in this or not (Gray, 2002). If these goals and intentions are transplanted, wholesale, into the 
cultural sector, however, then generating support for the sector becomes much more clearly 
associated with their actual fulfilment and rather less with claims of how culture can have a 
role to play in this process. As the Minister for Culture, Arts and Leisure said at the publication 
of the DCAL Business Plan (Northern Ireland Executive, 2013, p.1): “DCAL is not merely 
about culture, arts and leisure in isolation. Rather it is a department for the economy and a 
department of equality”. In this context, the new focus for the Department was intended to 
ensure “the transformation of our delivery models” (ibid, p.1). Moreover, as the plan itself 
notes in language resonant of Belfiore (2002), the new approach represents “a logical and 
inevitable evolution of the Department’s approach” (DCAL, 2013, p.7). If this is the new policy 
reality that DCAL was expected to be a part of, then how policy was to be understood and 
made would also require a change. 
 
The re-arrangement of the policy environment within which DCAL was operating was not the 
final stage of a more general re-structuring of the arrangements governing how cultural policy 
was organised in Northern Ireland. In 2014 the Northern Ireland Executive finally undertook 
the reorganisation of Departments that was, in the eyes of many politicians, officials and 
academics, long overdue. Nine new Departments began operating in May 2016, with a large-
scale transfer of functional activities from the old to the new. In the case of DCAL, the majority 
of its functions were re-located to a new Department for Communities – a revamped and 
enlarged version of the previous Department for Social Development – with the remaining 
functions being relocated in other administrative homes. This plan was drawn up by the Head 
of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and received unanimous agreement from the political 
parties represented in the Stormont Assembly. The intention of the changes to deliver more 
effective service delivery, and thus overcome many of the shortcomings associated with the 
unreformed system noted above, again reinforces the fact that cultural policy in Northern 
Ireland will be subject to a refocusing of intention that shifts it away from long-standing 
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commitments and objectives towards a brave new policy world that has a range of creatures 
within it that have not previously been seen as being as centrally policy relevant. 
 
Rearranging Policy Frameworks: An Explanation 
The simplest explanation for the changes that have taken place in the Northern Irish cultural 
policy system is that they represent the triumph of democratic politics: elected politicians 
making choices that have real meaning for the content, direction and intentions of public 
policies. Certainly the role of Ministers in this case in determining the meaning of policy, the 
distribution of functions between Departments, and the objectives of public policy 
demonstrates the ways in which representative democracy can directly affect cultural policy 
(Gray, 2012). However, there is more to the case than this – the underlying shifts in the long-
established arguments justifying how cultural policy should be managed, and what role it is 
understood to play within societies, both need to be made sense of if the choices and actions of 
elected representatives are to be given a context for explanation to rest on. Certainly the move 
away from the particular epiphenomenal framework that has justified the prioritisation of 
cultural policy in the past, and the replacement of the Keynesian value framework by newer 
justifications for state expenditure – both of which are key to understanding the changes that 
have taken place in Northern Irish cultural policy in recent years – and their impact on policy 
intentions, need to be analysed to demonstrate how they have underpinned the choices that 
elected representatives have made. The policy consequence arising from this (a shift away from 
simple versions of policy instrumentalisation towards the hyperinstrumentalisation of cultural 
policy that is currently taking place) can then be made sense of as a coherent strategic political 
choice rather than as a simple assault on culture. In this context the proposed changes in the 
organisation of cultural policy in Northern Ireland are not being driven by demands for 
improved efficiency in the use of the resources that have been allocated to cultural policy, or 
demands for increased effectiveness in the reaching of the goals of cultural policy but are, 
instead, dependent upon a complete reappraisal of what the point of cultural policy is in the 
first place. The hyperinstrumentalisation of cultural policy changes the focus of policy 
appraisal away from questions of inputs, outputs and intentions and places it firmly on policy 
outcomes, undercutting the traditional grounds upon which cultural policy is expected to 
function and denying the validity of culture as an independent policy sector in its own right. 
 
The normal view of instrumentalisation is that it is a top-down policy phenomenon imposed 
upon policy sectors by political actors who have other policy intentions than are to be found in 
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the policy sector that is being affected. The independence of actors within the affected policy 
sector is not at issue in this, instead it is concerned with the ways in which the sector can 
actively contribute to the non-sectoral demands that non-sectoral policy actors make 
(Vestheim, 1994), with choices over the courses of action to take being left with the actors 
within the sector. Normally these non-sectoral demands are assumed to be a secondary 
consideration for cultural policy actors but with hyperinstrumentalisation they assume 
significance in themselves and reverse the normal epiphenomenal equation that the cultural 
policy sector is accustomed to. Instead of non-sectoral benefits and outcomes arising from the 
outputs and intentions of cultural policy activity, these benefits and outcomes are expected to 
determine what the outputs and intentions of cultural policy will be in the first place. Resource 
allocation then becomes determined not on how it will affect the attainment of outcomes 
through how resources are utilised in the form of inputs and outputs but, instead, is determined 
by the outcomes that policy is intended to reach. In effect there is a pre-determination of policy 
requirements by the outcomes that are desired from action rather than the more usual 
expectation that outcomes will be determined by policy requirements. While this may be 
thought to represent a touching faith in the ability of policy-makers to determine the results of 
policy implementation, it is more thorough-going than this. Implementation itself is expected 
to be determined by the outcomes that are desired and, therefore, struggles over the results of 
policy implementation are obviated by a commitment to outcomes that leaves little scope for 
independent action. In the Northern Irish case this can be seen in the increased emphasis placed 
on ‘hard’ targets to monitor outcome attainment. In practice, this means that, “(F)or officials 
and ALBs, that is a sea change in how we look at things” which “filters down to the 
Department’s priorities to meet our Programme for Government commitments and then down 
to the ALBs’ business plans” (Hansard, 2013, p.2). Ultimately the Business Plan noted that the 
strategic plans of ALBs such as Arts Council of Northern Ireland “must now seamlessly align 
with the DCAL Mission Statement” (DCAL, 2013, p.13). This change of emphasis means that 
the requirements of successful cultural policy implementation are no longer relevant having 
been replaced by the demand for successful non-cultural policy implementation instead. 
 
The DCAL Business Plan does not go quite so far as to totally deny the relevance of traditional 
cultural policy objectives but it is certainly clear that these objectives are not ends in themselves 
but are merely the means towards other ends: “harnessing the transformative power of culture, 
arts and leisure to deliver step changes and a lasting social and economic transformation in the 
context of a sustainable economic agenda” (DCAL, 2013, p.7). In circumstances such as these 
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the older justifications for cultural policy (such as that it is good in and of itself, and that having 
a cultural policy will, almost automatically, generate desired non-cultural outcomes) are no 
longer politically relevant and can be seen as simply the attempt by core actors within the 
cultural policy system to manipulate the allocation of finance, prestige and value in their own 
favour. In effect arguments based on the ‘intrinsic’ value of culture, such as its ‘transformative 
power’, are denied validity by non-cultural actors, and the claimed epiphenomenal status of 
culture as the source of multiple forms of benefit for society is simply ignored in favour of 
(equally as) ideological claims and justifications concerning the objectives of policy. This is 
not to say that the case study presented provides the basis upon which to make claims about 
the future development of cultural policy in other national contexts. Indeed, further empirical 
research will be needed to assess the effects of hyperinstrumentalisation on the Northern Irish 
cultural sector. Yet whilst Northern Ireland is no doubt a quite particular historical and socio-
political environment, the shift to hyperinstrumentalism is primarily a political one which could 
easily and rapidly cross geographical boundaries. 
 
Indeed, the politicisation of cultural policy that this shift implies – cultural policy is no longer 
something important in its own right and can be treated in the same way as all other policy 
sectors – leads to a need to change the organisational, financial and managerial approaches that 
are utilised within the sector alongside the ideological changes that underpin this shift. To this 
extent recent developments in Northern Ireland have become a variant of the commodification 
of the cultural sector in Britain that started in the 1970s (Gray, 2000), with the variation arising 
from policy demands and requirements rather than economic ones. The abolition of DCAL can 
then be understood as part of this process, with this abolition allowing the establishment of new 
approaches to policy for the cultural sector. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the differences between 
the older approach based around epiphenomenal and value-producing ideas of cultural policy 
and the newer, hyperinstrumental, version. The emphasis on policy outcomes within 
hyperinstrumentalism means that the older arguments around the necessity for an arm’s-length 
relationship between the state and cultural policy are no longer appropriate: as culture is no 
longer an end in itself but is simply a means to an end then direction of the sector by political 
actors takes priority. The argument that culture and the arts need protection from ideologically 
committed political actors simply becomes irrelevant in this context and, thus, an arm’s-length 
relationship between the two falls by the wayside. The abolition, then, of DCAL is not the only 
part of the story to be told – the change of understandings, justifications and practices that are 
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associated with this re-structuring of the system for managing cultural policy is significant in 
its own right. The consequences arising from these changes lead to a situation where there is 
no need for a specific cultural policy, functioning within its own sphere of action, and with its 
own control of inputs, outputs and resource allocation. The instrumentalisation of culture in 
these circumstances is no longer an issue having been replaced by hyperinstrumentalisation 
instead.   
 
Conclusions 
The gradual shifting of the justifications for independent cultural and arts policies over the last 
40 years has led to a position where the need for such independence is subject to serious debate. 
With hyperinstrumentalism the focus on outcomes and the ends of policy means that cultural 
policy in itself is only as important as the ends to which it is directed. If these ends are not those 
of traditional cultural and arts policies then the justifications for retaining a separate arena 
within which these policies can be made, implemented and evaluated become moot, to put it 
mildly. The replacement of a taken-for-granted ritual rationality (Royseng, 2008) that depends 
upon the acceptance of unsupported, or simply poorly supported, claims and assertions by 
defenders of the epiphenomenal claims about the economic and social benefits that culture 
creates, with a set of equally as ideologically loaded policy preferences will doubtless be seen 
as an attack on the autonomy of the arts and culture. Whilst the recent work of Crossick and 
Kaszynska (2016) seeks to ground new debates around cultural value in the ostensibly 
epiphenomenal field of individual experience, the political weaknesses of the cultural sector 
which gave rise to the wider cultural value debate are well established (Gray, 2009; Gray & 
Wingfield, 2010). Hyperinstrumentalisation demonstrates the consequences for the sector in 
conditions where claims about the value of culture are irrelevant to political actors. As such, 
the establishment of better arguments to justify the continued existence of an autonomous 
sphere of cultural policy practice are needed if the sector is to be able to stake a claim to 
independence. 
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